Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament

Annual Report 2015–2016

Chair:

The Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP

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THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT

The Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP (Chair)

The Rt. Hon. Sir Alan Duncan KCMG MP	*The Rt. Hon. Fiona Mactaggart MP*
The Rt. Hon. George Howarth MP	*The Rt. Hon. Angus Robertson MP*
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Janvrin GCB GCVO QSO	*The Rt. Hon. Keith Simpson MP*
The Most Hon. the Marquess of Lothian QC PC	*The Rt. Hon. Gisela Stuart MP*

The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) is a statutory committee of Parliament that has responsibility for oversight of the UK intelligence community. The Committee was originally established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and has recently been reformed, and its powers reinforced, by the Justice and Security Act 2013.

The Committee oversees the intelligence and security activities of the UK, including the policies, expenditure, administration and operations[1] of the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Committee also scrutinises the work of other parts of the UK intelligence community, including the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office; Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence; and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office.

The Committee consists of nine Members drawn from both Houses of Parliament. The Chair is elected by its Members. The Members of the Committee are subject to Section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 and are routinely given access to highly classified material in carrying out their duties.

The Committee sets its own agenda and work programme. It takes evidence from Government Ministers, the Heads of the intelligence Agencies, officials from the intelligence community, and other witnesses as required. The Committee is supported in its work by an independent Secretariat and an Investigator. It also has access to legal, technical and financial expertise where necessary.

The Committee makes an annual report to Parliament on the discharge of its functions. The Committee may also produce Reports on specific investigations. Prior to the Committee publishing its Reports, sensitive material that would damage national security is blanked out ('redacted'). This is indicated by *** in the text. The intelligence and security Agencies may request the redaction of material in the Report if its publication would damage their work, for example by revealing their targets, methods, sources or operational capabilities. The Committee considers these requests for redaction carefully. The Agencies have to demonstrate clearly how publication of the material in question would be damaging before the Committee agrees to redact it. The Committee aims to ensure that only the minimum of text is redacted from the Report. The Committee believes that it is important that Parliament and the public should be able to see where information had to be redacted. This means that the published Report is the same as the classified version sent to the Prime Minister (albeit with redactions). The Committee also prepares from time to time wholly confidential reports which it submits to the Prime Minister.

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1   *Subject to the criteria set out in section 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013.*

ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016

Introduction

1.   This Report summarises the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) for the period between the appointment of the new Committee in September 2015 and June 2016.[2]

2.   The membership of the new Committee was confirmed by a motion in the House of Commons on 9 September 2015, and in the House of Lords on 14 September 2015. The Committee held its inaugural meeting on 15 September 2015, at which the Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP became the first Chair to be elected by the Members of the Committee under the terms of the Justice and Security Act 2013.[3]

3.   The Committee held its first formal meeting on 15 October 2015. Since then, the Committee has focused on three special inquiries (as summarised below), and it is the reports resulting from these which will form the primary record of our work for the period, rather than this shorter Annual Report.

Investigatory Powers Bill

4.   In March 2015, the previous Committee published a report on the full range of the intrusive capabilities which the Agencies use to protect the national security of the country (*Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework*). Our predecessors concluded that the investigatory powers the Agencies were authorised to employ were justified – and this Committee remains of that view. However, our predecessors considered that there was insufficient openness or transparency about those powers and recommended that the current legal framework governing the Agencies' powers should be replaced by a new Act of Parliament, clearly setting out all of the intrusive powers available to the Agencies, the purposes for which they may use them, and the authorisations required before they may do so.

5.   In November 2015, the Government published the draft Investigatory Powers Bill, in response to the ISC's Report and other reviews subsequently produced.[4] In late November 2015, a Joint Committee was appointed to undertake pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill. However, given the role of the ISC in overseeing the Agencies, and its ability to take evidence on classified matters, this Committee provided scrutiny of those aspects of the draft Bill which relate primarily to the Agencies' investigatory powers. The Committee held evidence sessions with all three Agencies and the Home Secretary (given her position as Minister responsible for the Bill).

6.   The Committee published its *Report on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill* on 9 February 2016. The Report concluded that the draft Bill had made some attempt to improve transparency, but the Committee was disappointed to note that it did not cover all of the Agencies' intrusive capabilities. The result is that the various intrusive powers and

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2   *The Committee's previous Annual Report covered the period until October 2014. Between this time and the General Election in May 2015, the Committee's work comprised the publication of three major reports: the* Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, *in November 2014;* Women in the UK Intelligence Community, *in March 2015; and* Privacy and Security: a modern and transparent legal framework, *also in March 2015.*

3   *Previously, under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Chair had been appointed by the Prime Minister.*

4   A Question of Trust, *published by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson, in June 2015, and* A Democratic Licence to Operate, *published by the Royal United Services Institute in July 2015.*

authorisations will remain scattered throughout different pieces of legislation: we view this as a significant missed opportunity.

7.   In addition to this overarching issue, the Committee made a number of detailed recommendations in its Report. Foremost of these was the recommendation that a universal privacy protection be added to the Bill, and the conclusion that the provisions in relation to certain Agency capabilities – Equipment Interference, Bulk Personal Datasets and Communications Data – were too broad and lacked sufficient clarity.

8.   The Government introduced the revised Bill to Parliament on 1 March 2016. The Committee subsequently received further written evidence from the Agencies and Home Office on the issues raised in our Report. In the light of this further evidence, the Committee tabled a number of amendments seeking to improve the legislation. We will continue to monitor the Bill as it progresses through Parliament.

Detainee Inquiry

9.   The ISC Inquiry into the role of the Government – and in particular the intelligence and security Agencies – in relation to detainee treatment and rendition has been the Committee's main focus since October 2015.

10.   In December 2013, the Prime Minister asked the previous Committee to consider those issues identified by Sir Peter Gibson in the interim report of his Detainee Inquiry and to examine whether the UK Agencies were involved in torture or mistreatment in counter-terrorism operations following the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001. This included whether the UK may have acted upon information gained as a result of torture or mistreatment, and the extent of UK association with, and knowledge of, the operations of the intelligence services of other countries which may have been engaged in such activities.[5] The investigation also covers the adequacy of the current compliance regime since the publication of the Consolidated Guidance in July 2010.

11.   The previous Committee agreed to undertake this Inquiry, subject to extra staff being provided. These staff were provided in June 2014, and work began on analysing over 30,000 highly classified documents – including file notes, emails and intelligence reports. Information received by the Inquiry also includes submissions which followed a public call for evidence issued in September 2014. (The Committee remains open throughout the course of this Inquiry to submissions from interested parties.)[6]

12.   The Committee has taken evidence from the three intelligence and security Agencies, the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary. Further evidence sessions are planned with those individuals who were involved at the time, including former Ministers and Agency staff. It is a detailed and long-term Inquiry into an important issue and is expected to occupy the Committee for some time.

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5   *The ISC's Detainee Inquiry is concerned with the role of the UK Government and the intelligence and security Agencies in relation to detainee treatment and rendition, and not the Armed Forces.*

6   *In December 2014, following publication of the report by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the* Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program*), the ISC investigated the specific question of whether the UK had requested redactions to be made to the published Senate reports and, if so, whether or not those redactions were justified. The Committee took oral and written evidence and inspected the relevant files in MI5 and SIS. In February 2015, the Committee published its conclusion that the UK-requested redactions were directly related to valid national security interests and CIA-proposed redactions relating to UK intelligence material (which the UK Agencies then agreed) were also justified.*

Lethal strikes in Syria

13.   On 7 September 2015, the Prime Minister announced that three UK nationals in Syria had been killed by two separate targeted drone strikes:

    i.   on 21 August 2015, the RAF had targeted and killed Reyaad Khan in the vicinity of Raqqah in Syria; two other individuals, both described as Daesh associates, were also killed (one of these, Ruhul Amin, was also a UK national); and

    ii.   on 24 August, Junaid Hussain (another UK national and a close associate of Khan) was killed in a US air strike in the Raqqah area.

On 29 October 2015, the Committee announced that it would examine the intelligence basis surrounding the targeting of these strikes.

14.   On 13 November 2015, UK national Mohammed Emwazi – known as "Jihadi John" – was killed in a further US air strike in Raqqah. The Prime Minister subsequently announced that the UK intelligence and security Agencies had been working with US colleagues to track down Emwazi.

15.   The Prime Minister agreed to provide the Committee with evidence on the strike against Khan. However, he considered the strikes against Hussain and Emwazi to be in a different category due to their being conducted by the USA. Senior officials from the three Agencies and the Cabinet Office have appeared before the Committee to give evidence and the Committee is currently continuing its scrutiny of the issues raised.

Other work

16.   The Committee has continued to monitor the expenditure, administration and policy of the Agencies through the Quarterly Reports it receives from them, as well as end-year information covering the 2014/15 financial year provided by each of the organisations which the Committee oversees. Given the Committee's focus on its specific inquiries this year, detailed scrutiny of these matters is not included in this, our first, Annual Report: the key facts and major developments for each organisation are summarised in the Annex. The Committee will be taking detailed evidence on these areas in the autumn.

Summary of Committee business

17.   In carrying out its work this year, the Committee has:

- held 17 formal evidence sessions with, amongst others, the three intelligence and security Agencies, Defence Intelligence, the National Security Secretariat, the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary;[7]

- held five further formal Committee meetings and 23 other meetings;

- visited the Agencies' headquarters and other parts of the intelligence community for briefings on four occasions;

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7   *The Committee was forced to cancel a further evidence session with the National Security Secretariat, the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism due to their failure to provide the requested information in advance of the session. This session will now take place in the autumn.*

- held bilateral discussions with those in the German intelligence community; and

- hosted delegations from Indonesia, Canada, Jordan and Germany.

Committee resources

18.   The Committee is currently supported in its work by a team of four core staff, six Detainee Inquiry staff and a part-time Investigator. The Committee's core budget was negotiated and agreed with the Foreign Secretary on behalf of the National Security Council in 2013 and is set at £1.3m – excluding security, IT, telecoms, report publication, accommodation, utilities and centrally-provided corporate services. As at July 2016, these are provided by the National Security Secretariat (security expenses) and the Cabinet Office (corporate expenditure).[8]

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8   *The budget has been fixed at this level to allow for the Committee to run two major investigations or inquiries simultaneously. However, when the ISC's Detainee Inquiry was established, the Cabinet Secretary and Ministers agreed that it should be funded at HM Government expense. As a consequence, the ISC Secretariat has been able to secure significant efficiencies and savings in the last financial year.*

LIST OF WITNESSES

Ministers

HOME OFFICE

The Rt. Hon. Theresa May MP – Secretary of State for the Home Department

Other officials

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

The Rt. Hon. Philip Hammond MP – Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Other officials

Officials

SECURITY SERVICE

Mr Andrew Parker – Director General

Other officials

SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Mr Alex Younger CMG – Chief

Other officials

GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS

Mr Robert Hannigan CMG – Director

Other officials

CABINET OFFICE

Mr Paddy McGuinness, Deputy National Security Adviser

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Air Marshal Philip Osborn CBE, Chief of Defence Intelligence

Other officials

ANNEX

Single Intelligence Account			
Expenditure in 2014/15			
Total budget and outturn			

£'000	Resource spending	Capital spending	TOTAL
Budget	2,251,337	381,385	2,632,722
Outturn	2,228,168	378,959	2,607,127

Expenditure by category	• Programme spending: £1,425m. • Administration spending: £20m. • Staff pay: £783m. • Capital spending: £379m.

The figures above represent the combined budgets of MI5, SIS and GCHQ, as already published in the Single Intelligence Account. The Committee has been provided with the individual figures for each Agency; however, these have been redacted in the subsequent pages since to publish them would allow the UK's adversaries to deduce the scale and focus of the Agencies' activities and effort more accurately. This would enable them to improve their targeting and coverage of the Agencies' personnel and capabilities, and to seek more effective measures to counter the Agencies' operations against them.

MI5 (Security Service)

Expenditure in 2014/15[9]

Total budget and outturn				
	£'000	Resource spending	Capital spending	TOTAL
	Budget	***	***	***
	Outturn	***	***	***

Expenditure by category	• Staff costs: £*** • Other revenue costs: £*** (this includes professional services, accommodation charges, research and development, and IT systems). • Capital costs: £*** • Against this, MI5 received income of £***

Administration

Staff numbers[10]				
		Total staff	SCS[11]	Non-SCS
	31 March 2015	4,037	55	3,982
	31 March 2014	3,902	50	3,852

Recruitment in 2014/15	• MI5 recruited 347 staff, against a target of 280. • This compares with 199 staff recruited during 2013/14.

Staff diversity			
	At 31 March 2015	SCS	Non-SCS
	Female staff	27%	41%
	BAME staff[12]	0%	8%

Major projects in 2014/15	• A programme to improve the exploitation and retrieval of MI5's information (in progress). • A programme to revamp MI5's audio, digital and video intelligence capabilities (completed Q2 2015). • A programme to improve the efficiency of the use of office space in Thames House (in progress).

Policy

Allocation of effort at 31 March 2015[13]	• International Counter-Terrorism: 64% • Northern Ireland-related terrorism: 18% • Hostile Foreign Activity and Counter-Proliferation: 13% • Protective Security: 5%
Major developments reported to the Committee	• A number of Daesh-linked threats in the UK. • Upstream disruption of various Daesh activities (which posed a threat to the UK) in Syria.

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9   As reported to the Committee in MI5's end-year report for the 2014/15 financial year.

10 These figures refer to MI5 headcount. Headcount figures include each permanent employee, irrespective of the hours worked.

11 Senior Civil Service and equivalent grades.

12 Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic. Not all staff have declared their ethnicity; percentages refer to those who have declared it.

13 MI5 reported its allocation of effort according to spending by each of its strategic objectives, in addition to raw staff numbers; these are the figures provided above. This differs from the other Agencies, which listed allocation of effort exclusively by staff numbers.

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)		

Total budget and outturn				
£'000	Resource spending	Capital spending	TOTAL
Budget	***	***	***
Outturn	***	***	***

Expenditure by category	• Staff costs: £*** • Operational expenditure: £*** • Other programme costs: £*** • Capital costs: £*** • Other costs: £***

Administration	

Staff numbers

	Total staff	SCS	Non-SCS
31 March 2015	2,479	75	2,404
31 March 2014	2,368	74	2,294

Recruitment in 2014/15	• SIS recruited 236 staff. • This compares with 149 staff recruited during 2013/14.

Staff diversity

At 31 March 2015	SCS	Non-SCS
Female staff	20%	36%
BAME staff[15]	0%	6%

Major projects in 2014/15	• A project to overhaul SIS's operational communications capability (work related to this is in progress). • A project to introduce a new information management system (in progress). • The Cross Served Desktop project, which gives SIS a single IT system across all stations worldwide (completed Q4 2015).

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14 As reported to the Committee in SIS's end-year report for the 2014/15 financial year.
15 Not all staff have declared their ethnicity; percentages refer to those who have declared it.

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) *(continued)*	
Policy	
Allocation of effort at 31 March 2015	• Key specific geographical requirements and tasks in line with those set out in the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, including in Russia, the Middle East and Asia: 19% • Other operational activities (including prosperity, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, cyber and access, and foreign materials): 21% • Other operational support (including covert operations, global network enabling, operational technology, data, operational security, and science research and innovation): 23% • IT infrastructure: 12% • Other corporate services (including security and compliance, finance and estates, human resources, legal, private offices, policy and communications): 24%
Major developments reported to the Committee	• SIS responses to terrorist attacks overseas, including those in Sousse, Paris and Ankara. • Several specific projects in relation to the situation in Syria. • Various pieces of intelligence gleaned with relevance to the UK's international relations.

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)			
Expenditure in 2014/15[16]			
Total budget and outturn			

£'000	Resource spending	Capital spending	TOTAL
Budget	***	***	***
Outturn	***	***	***

Expenditure by category	• Programme costs: £*** (this includes staff costs, military personnel, Private Finance Initiative payments, the technical investment programme, and non-cash and other programme resource costs). • Administration costs: £*** • Capital costs: £*** • Annually Managed Expenditure: £***

Administration

Staff numbers	

	Total staff	SCS	Non-SCS
31 March 2015	5,564	49	5,515
31 March 2014	5,401	45	5,356

Recruitment in 2014/15	• GCHQ recruited 443 staff, of whom three were SCS. • This compares with 393 staff recruited during 2013/14.
Staff diversity	

At 31 March 2015	SCS	Non-SCS
Female staff	18%	35%
BAME staff[17]	2%	3%

Major projects in 2014/15	• The Application Hosting Service extension, continuing and enhancing the storage and processing infrastructure provided to GCHQ (completed Q2 2015). • The Desktop Programme, which consolidated multiple high-classification computer terminal systems (completed Q2 2015). • The creation of a new high-end data centre (in progress).

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16 *As reported to the Committee in GCHQ's end-year report for the 2014/15 financial year.*
17 *Not all staff have declared their ethnicity; percentages refer to those who have declared it.*

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) *(continued)*	
Policy	
Allocation of effort at 31 March 2015	• Capability Exploitation:[18] 26% • Engineering: 18% • Specific geographical coverage to reflect the threats in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, which include the Middle East, South Asia and former Soviet Union: 14%. (The drawdown of forces from Afghanistan has enabled re-allocation of the substantial effort that GCHQ devoted to supporting UK military operations there.) • Other operational activities (including counter-terrorism, protective security, cyber defence, offensive cyber, economic security, weapons and serious crime): 18% • Corporate services (including human resources, finance, legal, IT services, policy and compliance): 24%
Major developments reported to the Committee	• Responses to terrorist attacks overseas, including those in Sousse, Paris and Sinai. • Insights gleaned into Daesh operations in Syria. • Progress made in various aspects of UK cyber security.

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18 Capability Exploitation is charged with finding and exploiting both secret and open source information in support of intelligence and security missions and ensuring that GCHQ remains at the cutting edge of tradecraft and technology.

Defence Intelligence (DI)			
Expenditure in 2014/15 [19]			

Total budget and outturn				
	£'000	Resource spending	Capital spending	TOTAL
	Budget	310,867	14,263	325,130
	Outturn	320,498	702	321,200

Expenditure by category	• Personnel: £194m. • Equipment support: £80m. • Research and development: £50m. • Other: £25m. • Against this, DI received income of £28m.

Administration	

Staff numbers				
		Total staff	SCS/Military equivalents	Non-SCS/ Military equivalents
	31 March 2015	3,697	6/8	1,359/2,324
	31 March 2014	3,735	6/7	1,317/2,405

Recruitment in 2014/15	• Most civilian vacancies filled from elsewhere in the Ministry of Defence either by posting or competition. • Military vacancies filled by posting from the Armed Forces. • In 2014/15, 53 civilian personnel were recruited by external open competition.

Staff diversity			
	At 31 March 2015	SCS	Non-SCS
	Female staff	0%	36%
	BAME staff [20]	0%	6%

Major projects in 2014/15	• Full operational capability of the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre at RAF Wyton declared in August 2014. • Assumption of responsibility for broader electronic warfare in Defence on 1 April 2014.

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19 *As reported to the Committee in DI's end-year report for the 2014/15 financial year.*
20 *Not all staff have declared their ethnicity; percentages refer to those who have declared it.*

Defence Intelligence (DI) *(continued)*	
Policy	
Allocation of effort at 31 March 2015	• Geospatial Intelligence: 33% • Measurement and Signature Intelligence, Human Intelligence and Signals Intelligence: 30% • Core all-source analytical work: 20% • Armed Forces security and intelligence training: 13% • Central support: 4%
Major developments reported to the Committee	• The moves of the Defence Geographic Centre from Feltham, the Royal School of Military Survey from Hermitage and No 1 Air Information Documentation Unit from RAF Northolt to RAF Wyton are planned as part of the reduction of the Defence estate. • Defence Intelligence supported 26 military operations in 2014/15, an increase from ten in 2013/14.

National Security Secretariat (NSS)

Expenditure in 2014/15[21]

Total budget and outturn				
	£'000	Resource spending	Capital spending	TOTAL
	Budget	37,500	2,400	39,900
	Outturn	38,400	2,400	40,800

Expenditure by category	• National Cyber Security Programme: £19.1m. • Pay costs: £11.4m. • Capital: £2.4m. • Other: £7m.

Administration

Staff numbers				
		Total staff[22]	SCS	Non-SCS
	31 March 2015	153	21	132
	31 March 2014	137	21	116

Recruitment in 2014/15	• NSS did not provide any detail to the Committee on recruitment in 2014/15.

Staff diversity			
	At 31 March 2015	SCS	Non-SCS
	Female staff	30%	41%
	BAME staff[23]	0%	9%

Major projects in 2014/15	• 2014/15 was the penultimate year of the £860m five-year Cyber Security Programme, intended to enhance UK resilience to cyber attack and protect UK interests in cyberspace. • The UK's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT UK) was established in 2014/15 and co-ordinates cyber incident response.

Policy

Allocation of effort at 31 March 2015	• NSS did not provide any information about allocation of effort.

Major developments reported to the Committee	• Work on the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. • The appointment of a Special Envoy on international data-sharing. • The update of the National Cyber Security Incident Management Policy.

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21 As reported to the Committee in NSS's end-year report for the 2014/15 financial year.

22 These numbers relate to all NSS staff, excluding the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. A large number of these staff will not be dedicated to the intelligence and cyber issues of which this Committee has oversight. It should also be noted that these figures relate to the number of staff registered on the NSS's resource management facility.

23 Not all staff have declared their ethnicity; percentages refer to those who have declared it.

Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO)			
Expenditure in 2014/15[24]			

Total budget and outturn	£'000	Resource spending	Capital spending	TOTAL
	Budget	3,600	0	3,600
	Outturn	3,561	0	3,561

Expenditure by category	• Pay costs: £3.3m. • Travel: £174,000. • The remaining budget is accounted for through stationery and other office-related costs.

Administration

Staff numbers		Total staff	SCS	Non-SCS
	31 March 2015	59	6	53
	31 March 2014	53	6	47

Recruitment in 2014/15	• JIO recruited 23 staff. • This compares with eight staff recruited during 2013/14. • The majority of JIO staff are on loan from other Departments on two-year contracts, and therefore tend to go through "_alternating years of feast and famine_",[25] hence the variation in recruitment figures.

Staff diversity	At 31 March 2015	SCS	Non-SCS
	Female staff	20%	29%
	BAME staff[26]	0%	14%

Major projects in 2014/15	• JIO reported no major projects for 2014/15.

Policy

Allocation of effort at 31 March 2015	• Geographical and thematic coverage: 54% • Operational support (including early warning team and duty officers): 36% • Corporate services (including central support and intelligence profession): 10%
Major developments reported to the Committee	• The response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the subsequent requirement for assessments and commentary. • The response to Daesh's invasion of Iraq. • Assessment work on Libya, particularly in relation to migration to Europe from Libya.

24 As reported to the Committee in JIO's end-year report for the 2014/15 financial year.
25 JIO end-year report 2014/15.
26 Not all staff have declared their ethnicity; percentages refer to those who have declared it.

Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)

Expenditure in 2014/15[27]

Total budget and outturn				
	£'000	Resource spending	Capital spending	TOTAL
	Budget	707,100	81,100	788,200
	Outturn	701,300	78,400	779,700

Expenditure by category	• Programme spending: £652m. • Administration spending: £49m. • Staff pay: £38m. • Capital spending: £78m.

Administration

Staff numbers[28]		Total staff	SCS	Non-SCS
	31 March 2015	597	26	571
	31 March 2014	569	26	543

Recruitment in 2014/15	• OSCT recruited 130 staff, of whom five were SCS. • This compares with 145 staff recruited during 2013/14, of whom seven were SCS.

Staff diversity	At 31 March 2015	SCS	Non-SCS
	Female staff	16%	52%
	BAME staff[29]	10%	19%

Major projects in 2014/15	• The Communications Capability Development, maintaining communications data and lawful intercept facilities.

Policy

Allocation of effort at 31 March 2015	• National Security Directorate: 24% • Communications Capabilities Development: 18% • PROTECT PREPARE (CBRNE) and science and technology: 14% • Strategic Centre for Organised Crime: 14% • PREVENT and Research and Information Communication Unit: 15% • Strategy, Planning and International: 11% • Security industry engagement: 2% • Director General's office: 1%

Major developments reported to the Committee	• Various details of the implementation of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, including:
	  ◦ progress of counter-radicalisation initiatives;
	  ◦ border security issues; and
	  ◦ emergency preparedness for attempted terrorist attacks.

27 As reported to the Committee in OSCT's end-year report for the 2014/15 financial year.
28 Full-time equivalent figures provided.
29 Not all staff have declared their ethnicity; percentages refer to those who have declared it.