The majority of the Committee's Special Reports, like its Annual Reports, are made to both the Prime Minister (in classified form) and to Parliament (with sensitive material redacted). However, a small number of reports, which deal with the most highly classified matters, may be made solely to the Prime Minister.
The published versions of the Committee's Special Reports are listed below.
Published July 2013
This Report was issued by the Committee in response to allegations that GCHQ acted illegally by accessing the content of private communications via the US PRISM programme.
Published June 2013
This Report investigates the Government's strategy for considering national security issues in relation to foreign involvement in the UK's Critical National Infrastructure.
This Report considers the use of communications data by the intelligence and security Agencies, and how the proposals in the Government’s draft Communications Data Bill might affect them.
This Report addresses the unanswered questions relating to the intelligence on the 7/7 bombers, particularly those arising out of the investigation of the 2004 fertiliser bomb (CREVICE) plot.
Published July 2007
This Report considers whether the UK security and intelligence Agencies had any knowledge of, and/or involvement in, rendition operations, and also the Agencies' overall policy for intelligence sharing with foreign liaison services.
This Report examines intelligence and security matters relevant to the July terrorist attacks, focusing in particular on: whether any intelligence which may have helped prevent the attacks was missed or overlooked; why the threat level to the UK was lowered prior to the attacks and what impact this had; and what lessons were learned from these attacks, and how these lessons are being applied.
This report covers the contact between detainees and the SIS, Security Service, both military and civilian DIS staff and military intelligence personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq.
This report examines whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications.
Inquiry into Intelligence, Assessments and Advice prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002Published December 2002